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Abstract 
This study ascertained the directional effect of institutional quality through contract intensive 
money and effective governance index to economic growth in Nigeria using annual time series 
data covering the period 1979 to 2018. The study hinges on both the Solow-Swan neoclassical 
growth model and Washington Consensus to provide insight on the policy necessity for 
institutional quality. To achieve this, the study employs both the Johansen Cointegration and 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach. The estimated cointegration test reveals joint 
relationship among the variables. OLS model shows that economic growth responds positively to 
institutional quality (contract intensive money) and is statistically significant while effective 
governance index exert positive and insignificant influence on the economy. The empirical 
results further reveal that economic growth respond positively and negative to the effect from the 
variables of domestic investment and foreign direct investment but significant. Furthermore, it 
takes 34% for the model to adjust to equilibrium in the long-term. The findings lend support to 
calls for quality institutions that can ensure that both private and public enterprise functions 
efficiently for sustainable growth and development in Nigeria. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model presents three factors driving the output of an economy - 
technological change, labour, and capital (Solow, 1956; and Swan, 1956); however, there are 
differences in country specific growth with different effective framework such as institutions that 
guide policy and programmes implementations. Many modifications has being done to this 
growth theory such as accumulation of human capital (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992) and 
others. Importantly, these scholars failed to explicitly states other propelling forces that drive 
economic growth. Institutions as one of the determinants of the economic growth was first 
discuss by North (1990) and since then there are several supporting literature to its effectiveness. 
Kormendi and Meguira (1985), Tullock (1987) reveal that nations with high level of civil 
liberties “strong institutions” experience economic performance. Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2001) reveal that governance performances influences country‘s 
economic performance. In an attempt to address this issue, Stiglitz (2001) in revised Washington 
Consensus became prominent in supporting augments for good governance “quality institution” 
for growth and development. However, no clear consensus on the effect of institutions and 
government policies on the economic growth have being reach simply due to lack of credible 
empirical evidence on the account that it is notoriously hard to measure institutions and establish 
causality (Radzeviča & Bulderberga, 2018).  
 
This is on the premise that the quality of institution is essential in providing an enabling 
environment for economic prosperity to the poorer proportion of populations in Nigeria. Studies 
such as Thorbecke, (2013), Iheonu, Ihedimma and Onwuanaku, (2017), Parks, Buntaine, and 
Buch (2017) have emphasized on the need for strong institutional quality to guarantee 
sustainable growth and development. The basic impediments to Africa and Latin America 
economic progress is in the uncertainty and manipulation whitespaces in the judicial system, 
corruption, bribery, tax evasion, ill-defined property rights and the existence of inefficient 
institutions as ill-conceived arrangements cause those countries to be risky and unattractive 
(Luiz, 2009: 65-70; Fosu, Bates & Hoeffler, 2006:2; Baliamoune, 2005; Birdsall, 2007:578- 589; 
Charnock, 2009:77). For instance, Asian economies, witnessed significant progress in their 
economies due to quality institutions but this is contrary to African economies including Nigeria 
characterised with high level of unemployment and poverty. In reaction to this, governments and 
multilateral agencies shifted focus on getting institutions right in developing countries by 
emulating the institutions of developed countries (Rodrik, 2008), despite the institutional 
harmonization institutional harmonization globally, there is little consensus on the effectiveness 
of these reforms (Andrews, 2013).  
 
Institutions in developing countries are mainly of a nature developing redistribution activities 
instead of production activities, creating monopolies instead of competitive conditions, 
restricting opportunities instead of developing them, these institutions rarely lead to investments 
that will increase productivity (Yildirim & Gokalp, 2016). In addition, accumulation in Africa is 
likely to be affected by institutional characteristics such as the distribution of political and civil 
rights, the quality of the legal system and government effectiveness (Epaphra & Kombe, 2018). 
Owasanoye (2019) alluded that African countries lose $90billion annually through illicit 
financial flow to overseas with bulk of it coming from Nigeria and institutional weakness is one 
of the major reasons for this setback.  
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Sachs and Warner (1997) as well as Hoeffler (2002) argued that Africa’s poor economic 
performance could be explain by the same variables that account for the growth performance in 
other developing countries. There is no consensus on what is actually responsible Africa’s poor 
economic performance (Kilishi, Mobolaji, Yaru & Yakubu (2013). In 1979, Nigeria establishes 
Code of Conduct Bureau, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, and Public Complaints 
Commission. As a continuation, in 1999 when Nigeria witnessed the fourth democratic era, it 
swift into action by instituting institutions that can ensure prudence and accountability in 
resource utilization in both public and private sector towards sustainable economic growth. 
Examples of such include Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in 2000, Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004, Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) 
in 2004, Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) in 2007 amongst other. Thirty-nine years 
down the lain (1979-2018), institutional deficiencies especially those charge with the 
responsibilities of ensuring efficient management of resource still functioning on lower ebb 
either due to lack of political will or weak legal backing thus it remains an impediment to the 
actualization sustainable economic growth in Nigeria. This is evident, as weak institutions have 
cost Nigeria fortunes to the tune of US$157billion as illicit financial flow outside the country 
between 2003 and 2012 (Global Financial Integrity Report cited in ACCA, 2017), however in 
2014 alone it stood at $2.2billion (GFI, 2018).  
 
Nigeria continues to depend on oil for 96% of its export and more than 75% of government 
revenue with high tendency for to shocks with little resilience (Fasan, 2018 culled from Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala’s Book). The collaborative roles of executive, legislative and judiciary arms of 
government is paramount to the functioning of these institutions especially in area of efficient tax 
system to raise revenue, contract enforcement, investment in basic infrastructure and inclusive 
governance. Given this ugly trend, this study set out to investigate the effect of institutional 
quality on economic growth in Nigeria in other to lay policy suggestions that can guarantee 
sustainable economic growth in Nigeria, based on the institutional quality outcome. The study 
used an ex-post facto research method, employing secondary data from Central Bank of Nigeria 
and World Bank Publications for the period from 1979 to 2018. This study employs Johansen 
Cointegration and Ordinary Least Square approach. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section two provides a literature review. 
Section three presents the methodology. The result and discussion presented in section four. 
Section five concludes with recommendations.   
 
2. Literature Review 
This study conceptualized institutional quality as those basic tenets that guide the operations of 
public and other private institutions in other to maximise wealth. The enforcement of these tenets 
is base on the act that establishes the institution, which most times conforms to global best 
practice. The pioneer of the theory in institutional economics North (1981) describes institutions 
as a set of rules compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of 
principals. Yildirim, (2015) define institutions as habits that bring limitations to our actions 
through rules and organizations settled in social life, direct us on how we should behave, and 
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lead social life. The trust factor that makes up the informal aspect of corporate structure of 
society forms the basis of social order, individual life and economic and political development 
through resulting effects in the form of growing business scales, industrial structure flexibility 
and increased social strength to external shocks (Gokalp, 2003). Trust increases the effectiveness 
of the economic and social system and makes it possible to produce more goods (Yildirim & 
Gokalp, 2016). To North (1990) institutions should promote and incentivize productive and 
wealth increasing actions such as innovation, capital and education acquisition, ensure property 
rights and prevent predatory, wealth-destructive behaviour (e.g. corruption, theft and rent 
seeking). Rodrik (2000) further emphasizes that institutions not only exert direct influence on 
economic growth but also affect other determinants of growth such as the physical and human 
capital, investment, technical changes, which in turn lead to an increase in the growth of an 
economy. Economic growth is the growth in both social and economic activities. Nigerian 
economy has being growing at average of 6.7% since 2000 to 2015 although, the fall in the price 
of crude in  2015, led to contraction of the growth of the economy by -1.6% in 2016 on the 
account that the economy is predicated on crude oil sales. In 2017, it started appreciating leading 
to a growth rate of 0.7% and this has remained on a positive trajectory at 2.0% in 2018. One of 
the major bottlenecks to actualizing its growth potentials is due to challenging business 
environment owing to the slow pace of reforms, and the lack of a market driven exchange rate 
policy puts a lid on investment (PWC, 2017).    
 
Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model emphasis centres on technological change, labour, and 
capital (Solow, 1956; and Swan, 1956) in boosting economy output. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 
(1992), later modified this with the inclusion of accumulation of human capital. However, this no 
longer prevail as there several driving forces to sustainable development and one of which is 
institutional quality and has taken centre stage in the midst of other determinants. The 
‘institutions’ quality hypothesis’ contends that the institutional framework within which 
economic agents interact with each other in an economy affects economic development 
(Alexiou, Tsaliki & Osman (2014). According to this view, what matters most are the ‘rules of 
the game’ in a society, which are defined by the prevailing explicit and implicit behavioural 
norms and their ability to create appropriate incentives for desirable economic behaviour (Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2003). 
 
The earlier studies attention was on the relationship between economic development and political 
institutions (Wittman, 1995; Clague et al. 1999; Wu and Davis, 1999), however as time evolve, 
the development of new measures has led to a number of different institutional issues being 
discussion (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006; Kostevc et al. 2007). For instance, studies by 
Dawson (2003), Adkins and Savvides (2002) showed that institutions that promote economic 
freedom have a positive effect on economic performance. In a similar vein, studies by 
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Sylwester (2002), and Easterly and Levine (2003), report that 
countries with high level of civil liberty experience equality in per capita income. In addition, 
Stiglitz (2001) in revised Washington Consensus is one of the leading in supporter for good 
governance for countries to experience rapid development. Currently, the bulk of the research on 
the determinants of economic performance concentrates on the role of institutions in the 
discussion and its focus has shifted from macroeconomic variables to the quality of institutions 
(Alexiou, Tsaliki & Osman, 2014), hence it is in the light of this arguments that this study is 
embark upon.  
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Radzeviča and Bulderberga (2018) the study examine the role of institutional quality in 
economic growth: implications for the Baltic States. The study use Generalized Method of 
Moments on a panel of 113 countries during 2006 -2016. Government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, tax burden, monetary freedom, financial freedom, trade freedom, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, and strength of investor protection has 
positive effect on economic growth. 
 
Carraro and Karfakis (2018) the study looks at institutions, economic freedom and structural 
transformation in 11 sub-Saharan African countries. The study use Panel Tool. Result reveals a 
positive and statistically significant effect of quality of institutions and economic freedom 
measures on structural transformation between sectors. 
 
Epaphra and Kombe, (2018) the study the investigate the effect of institutions on economic 
growth in Africa. The study use Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM), Fixed Effects (FE) 
and Random Effects (RE) models. 1996-2016. Institutional quality indicators political stability 
appears to be the most significant factor in explaining real GDP per capita growth in Africa 
 
Nguyen, Su, and Nguyen (2018) the study analyse institutional quality and economic growth: the 
case of emerging economies.  The study use System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) 
2002-2015. Finding shows significant positive impacts of institutional quality on economic 
growth. The institutional quality has negative effects on foreign direct investments (FDIs) and 
trade openness on economic growth. 
 
Iheonu, Ihedimma and Onwuanaku, (2017) the study examine the effect of institutional quality 
on economic performance in West Africa. The study uses a Panel data set of 1996 to 2015. 
Findings reveal that control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule 
of law have positive and significant impact on economic performance in West Africa. 
 
Izilein and Mohammed (2017) the study examine democratic institutions and foreign direct 
investment affect economic growth? evidence from Nigeria. The study Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) covering the period of 1981 to 2015. Finding shows that democratic institution 
exert negative impact growth while FDI exert positive relationship with economic growth. 
 
Yildirim and Gokalp (2016) an analysis of Turkey institutions and economic performance: a 
review on the developing countries. The study use Panel Data Analysis’ method 2000-2011. 
Finding shows that institutional indicators such as the integrity of the law system, regulations on 
trade barriers, restriction of foreign investments, the share of the private sector in the banking 
system have a positive effect on the macro-economic performance. Judiciary independence, 
government expenditures, transfers and subsidies, civil freedoms, the black market exchange 
rate, collective bargaining and political stability have negative impact on the macro-economic 
performances. 
 
Nabila, Shazia and Muhammad (2015) study examine the impact of institutional quality on 
economic growth in developing economies of Asia. The study use Panel ARDL for the period 
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1990-2013. Finding shows that institutional quality exerts positive influence on economic growth 
in addition to causality running between institutional quality to economic growth. 
 
Yusuf and Malarvizhi, (2014) the study assess institutional qualities and Nigeria’s economic 
growth performance. The study use RDL model approach to co integration 
and Causality. Findings reveal that sustainable improvement in good institutions is associated 
with rising growth and per capita income. Findings of this study indicate that there is a reverse 
causality. 
 
Udah and Ayara, (2014) the study investigate institutions, governance structure and economic 
performance nexus in Nigeria. The study use Ordinal Least Squares. Findings shows that 
government effectiveness, voice and accountability exert positive and significant relationship 
with economic performance. 
 
Alexiou, Tsaliki and Osman (2014) the study analyse institutional quality and economic growth: 
empirical evidence from the Sudanese economy. The study use ARDL bounds testing approach 
to cointegration proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001), 1972-2008. Result indicates that the 
institutional quality environment proxy by political freedom index exist negative effect on the 
economy’s economic prosperity. 
 
Devangi, Perera, and Lee (2013) the study investigate whether economic growth and institutional 
quality contributed to poverty and inequality reduction in South Asia (China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (East Asia), and Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka). The study use System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 1985-2009. 
Results show that corruption, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality are associated 
with a worsening of the income distribution. 
 
Kilishi, Mobolaji, Yaru and Yakubu (2013) the study examine institutions and economic 
performance in sub-Saharan Africa: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis. The study use Blundell-
Bond System Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimators. Findings show that 
institutions in sub-Saharan African have significant effect on economic performance particularly 
regulatory framework and government effectiveness. 
 
Dandume, (2013) the study investigate institution and economic growth performance in Nigeria. 
The study use ARDL approach to cointegration and Causality. Findings show that corruption has 
positive effect on economic growth while Accountable executive, Rule of law, competitive 
politics is not significant to economic. In addition, findings from Granger Causality test reveal 
that institution and economic growth granger cause each other. 
 
Valeriani, and Peluso, (2011) the study analyse the impact of institutional quality on economic 
growth and development: an empirical study of Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia, North America. The study use pooled regression model and a fixed effects model 1950 to 
2009. Results show that institutional quality do influence positively on economic growth. The 
impact (size or magnitude) of the institutional quality differs across regions. 
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Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, (2006) the study analyse institutional quality and economic growth: 
Maintenance of the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both? The study use Panel of one 
hundred developing and developed countries. Empirical results show that while some measures 
of institutional quality have a strong relationship with growth, democracy measures have no 
apparent relationship with growth, even though there is a very high correlation between these 
institutional measures that supposedly measure similar factors. 
 
There exist a good number of literatures with respect to cross-country investigations on the effect 
of governance or institutions on investment or economic growth while few available on country 
specific. Thus the need for this study in Nigeria with inclusion of variables of contract intensive 
money and effective governance index, proxied for institutional quality while other control 
variables includes; domestic investment, foreign direct investment and government expenditure.   
 
The kinds of data required in achieving these objectives are as follows: economic growth proxy 
by real gross domestic product (rGDP) serving as dependent variable while the explanatory 
variables are domestic investment (DOI), foreign direct investment (FDI) and (CIM) contract 
intensive money. Unlike the previous study, the justification for uses variables in this study is 
stated as follows. Foreign direct investment raises productivity through technology transfers.  
Domestic investment measured as a share of gross fixed capital formation to GDP, since in the 
growth literature it is considered an important factor engendering growth performance. 
Government expenditure comprises of consumption, investment, salaries and transfer payments, 
the inclusion of this variable in the model is to ascertain the adequacy within the period of the 
study. Institutional quality proxy by Contract intensive money is broad money supply minus 
currency in circulation divide by broad money supply and positively related to income, growth 
and investment.  CIM is use as an indicator of institutional quality (Clague & Keefer, 1999; Ubi 
& Udah, 2014; Oburota & Ifere, 2017).  In addition to the use of CIM, the most popular and 
widely used today is the Effective Governance Index under the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) produced by the World Bank—stemming from the works of Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). The lack of consensus 
among researchers on the most acceptable measure makes the conclusion a challenging. 
Government effectiveness measures quality and availability of public service, the bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil servants, the independence of the administration of political pressure and 
the credibility and transparency of the government's reform commitments and policies. 
 
3. Methodology 
The data for the study are annual time series data covering the period 1979-2018 
and were source from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and World Bank World 
Development Indicators. The methodology for this study took cue from that of Izilein and 
Mohammed (2017) who studied how democratic institutions and foreign direct investment 
affect economic growth in Nigeria for the period of 1981 to 2015. This study employs the 
Johansen Cointegration and Ordinary Least Square approach in the estimation of the model. This 
study also obtains the residual and incorporates into the model to ascertain the speed of 
adjustment it will take to equilibrate in the long-run. For uniformity, all the source data in this 
study are in logged to assume the same unit of measurement. 
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The model of this study is an off short of Solow (1956) model of economic growth used in the 
works of Udah and Ayara (2014) who examined institutions, governance structure and economic 
performance nexus in Nigeria. According to Solow model, output is a function labour (L) and 
capital (K), with constant returns to scale. The rate of capital accumulation in the long-run is 
higher than that of short-run, the marginal efficiency of capital approaches zero and the growth 
rate is subsequently determined by technical progress and growth in labour force. 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝐴𝐾𝑖
𝛼𝐿𝑖
1−𝛼        (1) 
 
Where 
GDP = real GDP A = total factor productivity K = Capital Stock L = Labour α = elasticity of 
capital with respect to output. The model assumes that each productive unit will use the same 
level of capital and labour with the following aggregate production function as: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝐴𝐾𝛼 𝐿𝛽         (2) 
 
In the study of Udah and Ayara (2014), the incorporate governance structure and institutions into 
equation two through their effects on total factor productivity (TFP) or technical efficiency on 
the premise of the role of institutions in increasing technical efficiency (David (1997), which in 
turn affects the efficiency of investment. Thus, their study assumes that TFP is a function of 
quality of institutions and governance structure (corruption, government effectiveness and rule of 
law). Thus 
 
𝐴 =  𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 +  𝛼1𝑋𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐶𝐼𝑀 +  𝜖𝑡     (3) 
 
Combining equations 2 and 3, we get  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝐶𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼, 𝐿𝛽 , 𝑋𝑡
𝑑 , 𝐶𝐼𝑀𝜑       (4) 
 
Where α, β, d, and φ are elasticity coefficients. From equation 4 an explicit estimation function is 
specified, ignoring labour and capital and taking the natural logs of both sides as follows 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛼1𝑋𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐶𝐼𝑀 + 𝜖𝑡     (5) 
 
Where, Xt = is a vector of explanatory variables including; voice and accountability 
(VACCOUNTR), Political stability and absence of violence (PSVIOLENCTR), governance 
effectiveness (GEFFECTR), regulatory quality (REGULATR), control of corruption 
(CORRUPTR), CIM = contract intensive money (CONTRINTR), Et = stochastic error term with 
the usual normality assumptions. 
 
In other to achieve the objective of this study, which is to investigate the effect of institutional 
quality on economic growth in Nigeria for the period of 1979 to 2018, the model by Udah and 
Ayara (2014) in equation (5), will be adopted and modified. Thus, the implicit functional model 
of this study is stated below: 
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𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑓 (𝐶𝐼𝑀, 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉, 𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐸𝐺𝐼)      (6) 
 
The mathematical form of the model is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝛾𝑜 +  𝛾1𝐶𝐼𝑀 +  𝛾2𝐷𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉 +  𝛾3𝐹𝐷𝐼 +  𝛾4𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃 +  𝛾5𝐸𝐺𝐼 +  𝜇   (7) 
 
Where: RGDP = real gross domestic product, CIM = Contract Intensive Money proxy for 
institutional quality, DOINV = domestic investment proxy by gross fixed capital formation, FDI 
= foreign direct investment, GOEXP = government expenditure and EGI = effective governance 
index proxy for good governance.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 LnRGDP LnCIM LnEGI LnFDI LnGOEXP LnDOINV 
 Mean  10.23485  0.751815  0.866076  4.034161  5.857500  12.40080 
 Median  10.01642  0.738434  0.931510  4.708170  6.370539  12.39908 
 Maximum  11.15353  0.918300  1.214644  7.215534  8.963639  15.43864 
 Minimum  9.530920  0.582416  0.000000  0.180000  2.002830  9.082448 
 Std. Dev.  0.566961  0.098092  0.231986  2.537113  2.347220  2.254298 
 Skewness  0.409122  0.281511 -1.271685 -0.366378 -0.306801 -0.090814 
 Kurtosis  1.670184  1.855960  5.944455  1.585334  1.609959  1.561532 
       
 Jarque-Bera  4.063223  2.709699  25.23091  4.230353  3.847869  3.503632 
 Probability  0.131124  0.257986  0.000003  0.120612  0.146031  0.173459 
       
 Sum  409.3940  30.07259  34.64305  161.3664  234.3000  496.0322 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  12.53635  0.375259  2.098885  251.0408  214.8682  198.1926 
       
 Observations  40  40  40  40  40  40 
Source: Extract from results 
 
Table 1 houses statistical characteristics of the logged variables used in this study. The results 
reveal an average growth of 10.23%, 0.75% and 0.87% for the log of RGDP, log of CIM and log 
of EGI respectively. Similarly, it is evident from the results that the log of FDI, log of GOEXP 
and log of DOINV had an average growth of 4.03%, 5.86% and 12.40% over the period of the 
study. The values of the standard deviations indicate low volatility for variables of RGDP, CIM 
and EGI while FDI, GOEXP and DOINV depict moderate volatility. As for the distribution of 
the skewness, the series is roughly equal given the closeness to zero for all the series. 
Importantly the variables of RGDP, CIM, FDI, GOEXP and DOINV exhibits platykurtic 
distribution given their kurtosis values of less than three. However, EGI exhibit leptokurtic 
distribution. Finally, the Jarque-Bera statistic implying that the series are not normally 
distributed given the validity of the significant values.  
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Table 2: Unit Root Test 
Table 1: Philip Perron (1988) Test 
Variables At Level First 
Difference 
Order of 
Cointegration 
LnReal Gross Domestic Product 0.745655 -3.265176** I(1) 
LnContract Intensive Money -0.557315 -5.704039*** I(1) 
LnEffective Governance Index -3.833528 -22.13522*** I(0) 
LnForeign Direct Investment -1.324494 -8.377772*** I(1) 
LnGovernment Expenditure -1.178419 -7.9354.1*** I(1) 
LnDomestic Investment -0.569799 -4.707117*** I(1) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity is rejected for all tests. The intercept and trend and intercept are included in the 
levels and the first difference equations. The optimal lag order are selected based on Schwarz 
information Criterion (SIC). 
Source: Extract from results 
 
The standard procedure on the data analysis was using a unit root test to check for stationarity. 
The Phillips and Perron (PP) test was employ and the table 2 above shows the results of the test 
becoming stationary at level (that is I(0) and first difference (that is I(1). Hence, the next stage is 
to proceed to the cointegration testing amongst the variables. Engle and Granger (1987) pointed 
out that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary time series may be stationary. If such 
a stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series is said to be cointegrated. 
The stationary linear combination may be interpreted as a long run equilibrium relationship 
between the variables. The Johansen system framework is employ to test for the presence of 
cointegrating relationships among the non-stationary variables. The result is presented below: 
  
Table 3: Co integration Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 Critical 
Value 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Max-Eigen 
 
0.05 Critical  
Value 
r=0*  148.7266  95.75366 r=0*  61.40642  40.07757 
r<1*  87.32017  69.81889 r<1*  45.77436  33.87687 
r<2  41.54581  47.85613 r<2  21.50809  27.58434 
r<3  20.03772  29.79707 r<3  10.72654  21.13162 
r<4  9.311177  15.49471 r<4  7.799519  14.26460 
r<5  1.511658  3.841466 r<5  1.511658  3.841466 
Source: Extract from results 
Note: r represents number of co integrating vectors. Both Trace statistic and Max-Eigen statistic 
indicates 2 co integrating equation each. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
The Trace and Max-Eigen value test in Table 2 reveal a long run relationship among the 
variables since their statistical value is greater than their respective critical values for the co 
integrating equations at 5% significance level. This implies a stationary linear combination, as 
such the non-stationary time series are co integrated. The application of the OLS approach will 
therefore yield informative, non-spurious and dependable results. Based on the stationary linear 
combination, the effect of institutional quality on economic growth is examine via the Ordinary 
Least Square method. The result is presented below: 
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Table 4: Regression result 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C 6.036164 0.229576 26.29272 0.0000 
LnCIM 1.396652 0.170987 8.168191 0.0000 
LnEGI 0.031730 0.060130 0.527690 0.6015 
LnDOINV 0.271874 0.039011 6.969096 0.0000 
LnFDI -0.060810 0.022923 -2.652778 0.0125 
LnGOEXP -0.001867 0.040390 -0.046234 0.9634 
ECM -0.038453 0.052017 -0.739250 0.4653 
Adjtd. R-squared = 0.987443 F-stat =485.9425 Prob(F-stat) =0.000000  
Source: Extract from results 
In table 4, the estimated linear OLS model reveals that institutional quality is positive and 
significant in accelerates economic growth through contract intensive money. CIM implies 
enforcement of contract rules protecting agreements between shareholders and management, or 
between minority and majority shareholders (sees La Porta et al, 1996 cited in Clague & Keefer, 
1999). Given the proportionality of the CIM value, any little change in government policy would 
increase economic growth. This finding is also in line with empirical findings of Carraro and 
Karfakis (2018), Epaphra and Kombe, (2018) but contrary to results of Izilein and Mohammed 
(2017). Similarly, the other variable of effective governance index proxy for institutional quality 
exerts positive and insignificant relationship with economic growth. This is against expectation 
and in line with the findings of Nguyen, Su, and Nguyen (2018), Alexiou, Tsaliki and Osman 
(2014), Dandume, (2013), Valeriani, and Peluso, (2011). Domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment is positive and significant with capacity to engender the growth of economic growth, 
however, has moderating effect. Surprisingly, government expenditure reveals negative and 
insignificant effect on economic growth, which goes to say that government budgeted 
expenditure might not be adequate to stimulate growth or it is not properly utilize, which can be 
attribute to weak institution set up.       
 
The speed of adjustment (ECM) to equilibrium is negatively sign as required – estimated at 34% 
and statistically significant. The adjusted R2 implies that 98% of the variations in economic 
growth are account for by institutional quality variables (contract intensive money and effective 
governance index), domestic investment, government expenditure and foreign direct investment. 
The F-statistics reveals the combine goodness of fit of the model. The F calculated (485.94) is 
greater than the F tabulated (2.62) – therefore, we deduce that the explanatory variables (CIM, 
EGI, DOINV, GOEXP and FDI) have joint influence on economic growth. Thus, the overall 
predictive power of the econometric model is statistically significant. 
 
To ascertain the stability of the coefficients of all variables in the models, the cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and cumulative sum of square (CUSUMSQ) were carried out using Brown et al 
(1975) model stability tests and the graphs are presented in Figure A and B. The movement of 
the recursive residuals revolves within and outside the ridgeline. Importantly, trends of the 
CUSUM suggest that the regression equation were stable considering that the CUSUM test 
statistic does not go beyond the bounds of the 5% and 2% level of significance while the 
behaviors of the coefficients of CUSUMSQ have the capacity to adjust in the long-run horizon. 
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Figure 1a: CUSUM for OLS   Figure 1b: CUSUM Square for OLS 
Source: Extract from Results   Source: Extract from Results 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This study on institutional quality and economic growth is enforce by theoretical and empirical 
views that institutional quality engenders economic growth. The choice of country specific 
analysis of Nigeria is on the account of high corrupt cases, not adherence to rules and 
regulations, littered uncompleted projects and the demand for provision of basic social and 
economic goods. In order to ascertain the direction of this dynamics, the study investigates the 
potential of institutional quality through contract intensive money and effective governance 
index to economic growth in Nigeria from 1979 to 2018, using both the Johansen Cointegration 
and Ordinary Least Square approach. 
 
The estimated cointegration test reveals joint relationship among the variables. The findings of 
the estimated linear OLS model shows that economic growth responds positively to institutional 
quality (contract intensive money) and is statistically significant at 1%, thus, suggesting that, 
economic growth is susceptive to changes in institutional quality while effective governance 
index exert positive and insignificant effect on economic growth. In addition, the results reveal 
that economic growth is engendered by the variables of domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment. The study found that it takes about 34% for institutional quality changes to 
equilibrate its effects on economic growth in the long-run horizon.  
 
Going by statistics, Nigeria’s economy is still developing economy operating below its potential 
output, this agrees with Thorbecke, (2013), Iheonu, Ihedimma and Onwuanaku, (2017) Parks, 
Buntaine, and Buch (2017) who emphasized on the need for strong institutional quality to 
guarantee sustainable growth and development. However, quality institutional can only work 
with strong synergy among the three arms of government and its operations guided base on the 
country’s peculiarity to maximise it benefits. 
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